Patterns of Rent-Extraction and Deployment in Developing Countries: Implications for Governance, Economic Policy and Performance by Auty, Richard M.
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2006 
*Lancaster University 
This study is a revised version of the paper presented at the 17-18 June 2005 UNU-WIDER anniversary 
conference, ‘WIDER Thinking Ahead: The Future of Development Economics’, directed by George 
Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the 
governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 
Norway (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611  ISBN 92-9190-784-7 (internet version) 
Research Paper No. 2006/16 
 
Patterns of Rent-Extraction and 
Deployment in Developing Countries 
 
Implications for Governance, Economic Policy 
and Performance 
 




Rents tend to be relatively high in developing countries and also very fungible, so that 
differences in the scale of the rent and in its distribution among economic agents 
profoundly affect the nature of the political state and the development trajectory. This 
paper identifies two basic trajectories to a high-income democracy linked to the scale 
and deployment of rents. Low-rent countries tend to engender developmental political 
states that competitively diversify the economy and sustain rapid per capita GDP 
(PCGDP) growth, which strengthens three key sanctions against anti-social governance 
(political accountability, social capital and the rule of law) to achieve endogenous 
democratization that is incremental. In contrast, rent-rich countries are likely to 
experience a slower and more erratic transition. This is because high rents tend to …/ 
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nurture non-developmental (predatory) political states whose deployment of the rent 
locks the economy into a staple trap, which carries a high risk of a growth collapse. The 
events presaging a growth collapse weaken sanctions against anti-social governance. 
However, a growth collapse may abruptly trigger democracy if exogenous factors are 
favourable, although such a change is likely to prove unstable and prone to regression. 
Very preliminary tests of the link between PCGDP growth and sanctions against anti-
social governance suggest that social capital and law strengthen as predicted by the 
models for low-rent countries, but political accountability lags. Rent-rich countries 
exhibit the expected weaker link between PCGDP growth and democratization, an 
outcome consistent with a more erratic transition towards a high-income democracy. 
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1 The  context 
Attempts to model the political economy of the developing countries’ transition to high-
income democracies proliferate, despite scepticism that the process is too complex and 
idiosyncratic to generalise.1 Many economists2 and political scientists3 support a 
consensus view that per capita income is positively associated with political 
accountability—rising income ‘causes’ government to improve.  
 
The consensus has not gone unchallenged, however. For example, Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2002) suggest that the causal direction may be the reverse of the consensus. Zak and 
Feng (2003) report that transitions to democracy can occur if economic growth falters. 
Elsewhere, Przeworski et al. (2000) claim that rising per capita income does not change 
the likelihood of transition to democracy although it does reduce the probability of 
regression. They explain this by the fact that the gains from a shift to democracy 
attenuate at high-income levels due to the declining marginal utility of the redistribution 
gains, whereas the losses from any associated destruction of capital stock (due to 
violence) strengthen with rising incomes. However, two recent studies (Boix and Stokes 
2003; Epstein et al. 2004) convincingly challenge Przeworski et al. (2000). 
 
The explanations proffered for these contested outcomes are rather parsimonious. For 
instance, Barro (1999) notes the ‘surprising’ lack of a theory that might inform the 
debate. This paper draws upon recent theoretical and empirical literature to help fill this 
gap and also to reconcile the contesting views. It reflects early work on a planned 
research programme into how the political state in developing countries is affected by 
differences in the scale of the economic rent and how the rent is extracted and deployed. 
The paper therefore presents themes for further research rather than definitive findings. 
 
Three basic categories of rent are commonly identified in developing countries, namely 
natural resource rent, contrived rent (or government monopoly rent) and geopolitical 
rent (reflecting the revenues that states extract from the global community through 
strategic alliances, humanitarian concerns or terror threats). All three rents are relatively 
high because most developing countries still depend on their primary sectors (which 
boosts the relative importance of natural resource rent); they often receive sizeable 
amounts of external aid (geopolitical rent) and, they tend to have fallible institutions 
(rule of law, property rights, legislative assemblies and bureaucracies), which tendency 
increases both the temptation to extract contrived rent and the risk of its sub-optimal 
deployment. Within specific developing countries each of the three rents can measure 
up to tens of percent of GDP and in aggregate they not atypically range from 15-50 per 
                                                 
1 Haggard (1990: 3-4). 
2 Barro (1996, 1999); Feng and Zak (1999). 
3 Lipset (1959); Jackman (1973); Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994).   2
cent of GDP (and more during commodity price surges like the 1974-78 and 1979-81 oil 
booms). Rent on such a scale attracts competition from political and economic agents 
and its capture can severely distort the political economy at the expense of broad-based 
welfare. 
Table 1: A typology of political states based on aims and autonomy (after Lal 1995) 
Autonomy + 
Type 





Military elite  Soft constraint  Nigeria 1966-79 + 
1983-99, Ghana 
1970-83, 
    Central planning  Soft constraint  Algeria, 
Turkmenistan, 
USSR 







Hard constraint  Chile 1975-89, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Taiwan 





Saudi Arabia, UAE 







Soft constraint  Argentina. Brazil, 
Mexico, Bolivia 
   Public  officials 
capture policy 
Soft constraint  Azerbaijan, India, 
Kazakstan, Russia, 
Uzbekistan 
   Ethnic  alliance 
captures policy 
Soft constraint  Kenya, Sudan, pre-
1993 South Africa 






growth + equity 
Hard constraint  Malaysia, Botswana 




Costa Rica,  
Sri Lanka 
Source: Author’s summary. 
 
This paper derives a dynamic political economy model from two rent-driven stylised 
facts economic models, namely the Competitive Industrialization Model (CIM), which 
is associated with low rents and the Staple Trap Model (STM) linked to high rents. 
These rent-driven economic models suggests that the smaller the rent relative to GDP 
and the more diffusely it is spread across economic agents, the greater the probability of 
engendering a developmental political state4 (Table 1) that competitively diversifies the 
economy to sustain rapid growth in per capita GDP (PCGDP).5 This economic 
                                                 
4 A developmental political state is defined here, after Lal (1995), as one that has sufficient autonomy to 
pursue a coherent economic policy and the aim of raising social welfare, and it may be autocratic.  
5 Auty and Gelb (2001: 126-44).   3
trajectory incrementally strengthens three sanctions against anti-social governance 
(political accountability, social capital and the rule of law) to foster endogenous 
democratization. 
 
The CIM prediction of a developmental political state is rooted in the observation that 
limited rent-seeking opportunities in resource-poor countries concentrate government 
efforts on wealth creation through the provision of public goods and the maintenance of 
efficiency incentives. If government income depends wholly on taxation of productive 
activity rather than drawing also upon rent extraction, the political state retains strong 
incentives to pursue policies that encourage economic inputs to be deployed efficiently. 
Consequently, the economy adheres to its comparative advantage, which for a resource-
poor country initially lies in competitive industrialization,6 which promotes endogenous 
democratization. The corollary is that the larger the rent relative to GDP and the more 
concentrated it is on a handful of economic agents, the greater the probability of 
engendering a non-developmental political state that presides over a growth collapse 
(the STM development trajectory) and represses political accountability. However, a 
growth collapse may trigger an abrupt switch to democracy where exogenous factors are 
favourable. This exogenous democratization trajectory is therefore likely to be erratic 
and unstable. 
 
This paper focuses upon the elaboration of the political component of the political 
economy models. It begins in the next section, section two, by establishing a six-fold 
classification of political states linked to differences in the scale and deployment of the 
rent. The typology identifies parallel low rent and high rent variants of the basic stylised 
transition from an autocratic state to a democracy via an oligarchy. Section three 
explains the link between the CIM development trajectory and endogenous 
democratization. Section four links exogenous democratization to the high-rent STM 
trajectory. Section five reports simple preliminary tests of the predictions of the 
endogenous and exogenous democratization models. Section six briefly illustrates some 
policy implications while section seven summarises the findings, and suggests a 
research agenda.   
2  A rent-based typology of political states 
This section elaborates a rent-driven typology of political states from the typologies of 
Lal (1995: 310-27), Olson (2000a), Auty (2001) and Eifert et al. (2003). Olson’s 
(2000a) evolutionary typology provides a useful starting point. His basic premise is that 
the incentive for a government to provide public goods (and thereby reduce transaction 
                                                 
6 Industry tended to be the motor for economic transition during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
but it is increasingly recognised that some services may perform that role, so the specific product is less 
important than the lead sector’s capacity to rapidly accumulate all forms of capital by flexibly 
recombining inputs in response to the changes in the relative prices of factors of production as 
development proceeds.    4
costs and strengthen investment incentives) increases as the political state encompasses 
the interests of a wider fraction of society. Olson’s four basic categories of political 
state assume a progressive improvement in governance moving from the roving bandit 
state (conceived as a pillaging warlord) to a democracy, via two intermediate stages, 
namely the stationary bandit state (an autocrat) and the oligarchic state.  
 
More specifically, whereas the roving bandit plunders a region and moves on to the next 
region, the stationary bandit has a longer time horizon due to the need to ensure a 
sustained income stream from the region of residence, which is the region being 
exploited. The stationary bandit therefore maximizes his income by providing some 
public goods that facilitate exchange (such as law and order, income-related taxation 
and essential infrastructure) and leaving producers with sufficient revenue to retain an 
incentive to increase output. An oligarchy reflects the capture of the political state by a 
political group that administers patronage in a more collegiate manner than either form 
of autocratic state. It will tax less than a stationary bandit does and will also invest more 
in public goods. This is because, unlike either bandit state, the elite in an oligarchy is a 
producer of goods as well as a consumer of rent so it benefits directly from incentives to 
boost output and it is also less dependent for its income upon siphoning off rents. In 
other words, an oligarchy has wider encompassing interests than a stationary bandit 
state does. Finally, a democracy embraces even wider interests and therefore promotes 
conditions still more conducive to broad-based wealth creation.  
 
Olson’s system can be usefully elaborated into a six-category typology (Table 2) by 
recognising low-rent and high-rent variants of the three basic types of political state 
(autocracy, oligarchy and democracy). The typology identifies two paths from autocracy 
to democracy: one is likely to nurture developmental governments under the incentives 
conferred by low rents and the other is a high-rent path linked to more predatory 
governments. The six-fold typology can be further extended to enhance its flexibility by 
recognising sub-groups of the basic types, and some examples are given below. 
However, the main purpose of the remainder of this section is to explain the principal 
features of the six political states in Table 2. 
 
Olson assumes the stationary bandit state will be benevolent and, relative to the roving 
bandit this may be true, but empirical evidence suggests it is useful to acknowledge how 
differences in rents affect the conduct of stationary bandit states. For example, Olson’s 
stationary bandit category includes rent-poor South Korea during 1963-87 along with 
rent-rich Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Yet whereas the South Korean elite was careful 
to enrich itself without allowing rent seeking to damage GDP growth and welfare gains 
(Khan and Jomo 2000), both rent-rich Caspian Basin governments conferred wealth in 
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Table 2: Evolution of political accountability under political states with differing autonomy and aims  
Autonomy of state  Basic aims of state   Critical features  Rent pattern   Strength of 
sanction  
against anti-social  governance 
    Political 
accountability 
Social capital   Rule of law 
       




Secure rapid GDP 
growth to sustain 
compact elite + 
build social unity  
Low rent; external 
threat; poor have 
low opportunity cost 
Low rent siphoning: 
efficient diffuse rent 
raising + dispersal 
Weak; but 
predation curbed by 





bridging + linking 
Nominal; elite 
dispense justice, at 
times arbitrarily 
       
Diffuse Factional 
Oligarchy 
Expand elite to 
deter policy capture 
and sustain rapid 
GDP growth  
Low rent; Intra-elite 
(land/ethnic/army) 
rivals; rapid equal 
GDP growth  
Low diffuse rent 
extraction for public 
goods + (skewed) 
wealth creation 
Moderate: growing 





+ bridging socap. 
Strengthening legal 
protection; common 
law fairer > civil law 




Growth then equity 
via providing basic 
social entitlements 
Low rent; middle 
class growth saps 
elite + shrinks poor  
Diffuse extraction + 






+ bridging socap.; 
risk of Olson effects 
Legal 
independence cuts 
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Non-Developmental       
Predatory 
Autocratic Dictator 
Maximise elite rent 
siphoning through 
force if necessary 
High rent; violent 
predation; staple 
trap trajectory  
Point rent 
extraction by elite 
slows GDP growth 
None: power held 
by violence, which 
only elite contest 
Weak: intense elite 
rivalry; weak bond 
socap.of poor v. 
elite 
None: elite controls 
by force; poor rely 
on custom  




captures policy to 
sustain rent + 
power 
High rent; unequal 
asset share; staple 
trap trajectory  
Point extraction but 
some public goods 
benefit mainly elite 
Minimal; puppet 
legislature run by 
oligarchy;  
Dependent on elite; 
repressed civic 
associations  
Skewed to favour 
elite > poor  




Capture policy to 
benefit tribal clients 
even if slows long-
term GDP growth 
Democracy 
polarised on tribal 
lines; retarded GDP 
growth  
Rent extraction + 
skewed distribution 
to tribal clients > 
GDP growth 
Fragile: parliament 
liable to wild policy 






Judiciary subject to 
capture + biased to 
tribal clients  
Note: Moving down the table, political accountability strengthens incrementally and endogenously under developmental political states (associated with low rent). It is retarded 
for non-developmental political states, but after a growth collapse exogenous democratization can occur abruptly if neighbourhood effects are accommodate. 
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the 1990s on an autocracy even as basic services deteriorated and poverty increased. If 
stationary bandit states are likely to be benevolent in rent-poor countries and predatory 
in rent-rich ones, it is useful to formally identify benevolent and predatory variations of 
the autocratic state (Table 2). In this context, Olson’s roving bandit state may be 
regarded as an extreme variant of the predatory autocracy, one of several extensions to 
the typology that enhance its flexibility. Saudi Arabia provides an example of an 
extreme variant of the benevolent autocracy, which is paternalistic, as identified by 
Auty (2001) and Eifert et al. (2003: 89). The latter also recognise a reformist autocracy 
(benevolent autocracy in Table 2) and predatory autocracy (the same in Table 2). 
 
It is similarly useful to distinguish more than one form of oligarchy because a low-rent 
oligarchy is likely to rely more on wealth creation and less on rent siphoning than a 
high-rent oligarchy is. In addition, a low-rent oligarchy will increasingly comprise 
industrialists rather than landowners because the low-rent CIM development trajectory 
diversifies early into manufacturing (as explained in Section 3). According to Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2005) industrialists are likely to form a diffusing oligarchy, a category 
recognised in Table 2 (second row). This is because industrialists rely more heavily on 
cooperation from an urban workforce to sustain their wealth than landowners do and 
also the assets of factory owners tend to be more concentrated and vulnerable. A diffuse 
oligarchy is also likely to exhibit sufficient plurality to impose checks and balances on 
what any sub-group can gain from policy capture. Moreover, an oligarchy with a diffuse 
structure has within it the seeds of its own dissolution because the political jockeying it 
entails is likely to encourage the co-option of outsider groups, most likely factions of 
the middle class, so that the political system is one that increasingly shifts towards a 
democratic political state. Nineteenth century Britain provides an illustration of a 
diffusing oligarchy.7 In contrast, a high-rent oligarchy can use the rent to sustain its 
monopoly and by force if necessary, whether the collegiate group comprises 
landowners, the military or a dominant ethnic group.  
 
Finally, it is useful to distinguish between polarised and consensual democracies 
(respectively, the ‘factional’ and ‘mature’ democracies of Eifert et al. 2003: 89). The 
STM explains why high rents polarize income distribution and society, and stimulate 
the formation of political coalitions for against income redistribution. Such a polarised 
democracy struggles to sustain economic growth because elections bring abrupt and 
large changes in policy, which undermine the coherence of economy policy and 
diminish investor confidence. Jamaica, Mauritius and Malaysia provide interesting 
                                                 
7 Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argue that concern for the inadequate provision of urban public goods was 
the dominant factor behind an incremental widening of the franchise. During the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, rising urban mortality fuelled demands to redirect public funds from the pork barrel 
patronage of an autocratic government towards improving public goods, notably urban sanitation. Lizzeri 
and Persico (2004) demonstrate that the 1832 electoral reform triggered this process, which did not 
increase its share of GDP but rather shifted it towards local government and urban public goods 
provision. The redirection of public funds continued for a century and the periodic widening of the 
franchise incrementally transformed a diffusing oligarchy into a democracy.    8
examples.8 In contrast, as Section 3 now shows, low-rent economies are less likely to 
have a highly skewed income distribution, while in addition economic success builds a 
consensus in favour of an economic policy that promotes wealth creation over 
redistribution (row 3, Table 2) Consequently, policy differences between political 
parties within a consensual democracy are modest so that elections do not bring abrupt 
changes and economic policy is more coherent. The next section explains why low-rent 
political states are likely to evolve incrementally towards a consensual democracy, in 
marked contrast to high-rent political states. 
3  The endogenous democratization model 
This section explains endogenous democratization by linking the CIM development 
trajectory to three sanctions against anti-social governance (political accountability, 
social capital and legal institutions).  
3.1  Low-rent growth: the competitive industrialization model 
The CIM model explains why low rents limit the period of dependence on primary 
product exports and nurture early industrialization (at a relatively low per capita 
income), which is both labour-intensive and competitive and triggers beneficial 
economic and social circles (Auty 2001). Focusing on the virtuous economic circle, 
early industrialization also entails early urbanization, which speeds passage through the 
demographic cycle, lowering the rate of population growth. This improves the 
worker/dependent ratio and raises the rate of saving and investment in GDP (Annexe 
Figure 1). It also rapidly absorbs surplus rural labour so that labour costs rise and propel 
diversification into capital- and skill-intensive industry. This competitive diversification 
of the economy in turn sustains investment efficiency and strengthens the resilience of 
the economy, so that the CIM achieves rapid and sustained PCGDP growth. 
 
As for the virtuous social circle, income distribution is equitable because the early 
elimination of surplus labour puts a floor under the wages of the poor and the rapid 
accumulation of human capital caps the skill premium. In addition, competitive 
urbanization (as opposed to dependent urbanization under high-rent growth) is 
associated with the rapid accumulation of market enhancing social capital. In this way, 
                                                 
8 For instance, in post-independence Jamaica, the two leading political parties polarized the electorate 
because each party built a political coalition either to promote major wealth redistribution or to protect the 
status quo. The 1972 election triggered an abrupt swing in economic policy that promoted rapid 
redistribution, deterred investment and led to a spectacular growth collapse in the late 1970s. Mauritius 
provides a second example. Its political state exhibited a similar polarization to Jamaica prior to the 1970s 
when sugar plantations dominated the economy. Thereafter a shortage of land installed competitive 
labour-intensive industrialization as the economic motor, ushering in a phase of consensual democracy in 
which each party backed wealth creation over redistribution (Findlay and Wellisz 1993). Malaysia 
provides an interesting anomaly where the adverse effects of polarization were recognised and avoided 
through an agreement that redistribution towards the low-income Malay majority should not be at the 
expense of the wealth-generating capacity of the large Chinese minority.    9
the competitive industrialization trajectory rapidly accumulates produced capital (Auty 
and Kiiski 2001: 19-35), human capital (Birdsall et al. 2001: 57-75) and social capital 
(Woolcock et al. 2001). The competitive industrialization trajectory sharply raises the 
genuine saving coefficient, implying that the trajectory is strongly sustainable.9 Per 
capita incomes can double every ten years so that the transition from poverty to a 
mature economy can occur in less than two generations compared with more than five 
generations for the developing countries on average.10 
3.2  CIM trajectory, sanctions versus anti-social governance and endogenous 
democratization 
The CIM trajectory strengthens political accountability for two main reasons. First, 
competitive industrialization rapidly restructures the economy away from its initial 
dependence on the primary sector so that the relative importance of natural resource 
rents declines early,11 creating pressure to diversify tax revenue away from commodity 
and export taxes towards sales, income and profits taxes. This trend intensifies pressure 
for greater political accountability regarding how public revenue is raised and allocated. 
Lizzeri and Persico (2004) describe just such a self-reinforcing interaction for 
nineteenth century Britain. 
 
Second, along with the swift relative decline of the primary sector, the proliferation of 
competitive manufacturing shrinks the scope for state intervention and rent seeking, 
effectively de-politicizing the economy.12 For example, Aslund (2000: 399-424) reports 
an inverse relationship between increasing reform (i.e. greater competition) and the 
scale of rent seeking in the Russian Federation. After initially stalling, Russian reform 
briefly restarted during 1994-95 and this shrank both rents and inflation but when 
reform stalled a second time rent-seeking opportunities re-expanded. Li et al. (2000: 
284) set out the basic insight with reference to China: ‘All government bureaucrats seek 
rents and are reluctant to give up their power. However, without a monopoly, rents can 
be guaranteed only by improving the efficiency of their firms.’ They show how growing 
competition between firms in adjacent administrative areas exerted pressure on local 
governments to strengthen efficiency incentives so that the governments can escape 
onerous charges from loss-making firms. The local governments achieved this by 
establishing profit-sensitive co-operatives like town and village enterprises (TVEs) in 
place of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or by allowing entry of new private firms. 
Consistent with this thesis, privatization of state assets in China proceeded fastest where 
competition was most intense, as with simple undifferentiated products or where 
transport costs fell sharply, as in the Southeast coastal provinces. It also proceeded 
                                                 
9 Hamilton (2001: 36-56). 
10 According to Syrquin (1986: 232). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ranis and Mahmood (1992).   10
faster at lower tiers of government where the absence of scale economies facilitated 
entry by new firms and officials had least administrative and legal leverage to protect 
firms.  
 
The second sanction against anti-social governance, social capital, may continue to be 
effective where political accountability regresses, as recently shown in Georgia. The 
World Bank (1997: 81) defines social capital as the group knowledge and trust backed 
up by sanctions that facilitate economic exchange by reducing uncertainty and risk. In 
economic terms social capital manifests itself in variations in transaction costs between 
regions and countries.13 In sociological terms the two principal components within 
social capital are civic spirit and civic associations. Civic spirit is defined as the 
reluctance of individuals within society to take advantage of private misfortune or 
public administrative error. Civic associations are horizontal networks such as 
membership of societies for politics, professions, environment, arts, sport and trade 
unions that build trust.  
 
Evidence is emerging that the rate of social capital formation traces an S-shaped curve 
with rising per capita income, accumulating slowly at first before accelerating through 
mid-income levels as urbanization peaks and then decelerating at high-income levels. At 
low-income levels transaction costs are high because many markets are missing due to 
the low density of economic activity and absence of the physical infrastructure that 
facilitates exchange.14 In these circumstances, most transactions occur over short (i.e. 
local) distances15 and are facilitated by bonding social capital because it provides 
individuals with insurance against risk, although the community as a whole is not 
protected from unforeseen shocks. However, bonding social capital can stifle innovative 
and entrepreneurial activity, thereby impeding development at low-income levels 
(Stiglitz 1995: 48-81). This is because bonding social capital often requires any gains 
accruing to an individual, whether from luck or unusual diligence, to be shared among 
the group, hampering wealth accumulation and thereby depressing individual incentives 
to innovate. 
 
As development proceeds, however, urbanization allows individuals to reduce their 
dependence on local groups by extending social links beyond the individual village or 
town through regional associations. Such linking social capital provides an alternative 
                                                 
13 Djankov et al. (2003). 
14 Rural India in the 1960s provides examples of market failure. The basic unit of socio-economic 
organization, the village, was too small to support competitive banking, crop markets and an all-weather 
road (Johnson 1970). In the absence of these facilities, little progress could be made in specialising in 
high-productivity crops, whether the response required to boost incomes where land is becoming scarce 
and labour relatively abundant. Meanwhile, real interest rates might reach triple figures (Johnson 1970) 
and a location more than 4 kilometres from an all-weather road render transport costs too high to allow 
villages to adopt green revolution technologies (Owen 1967). 
15 Woolcock and Narayan (2000).   11
means of risk reduction to bonding social capital but imposes fewer redistributive 
claims than bonding social capital. Moreover, expanding spatial horizons also allow 
scale thresholds to be crossed to create viable markets and increase the division of 
labour. Social capital therefore accumulates fastest in low-rent countries because 
urbanization occurs earlier than in resource-rich countries, and is characterised by 
atomised transactions negotiated out of mutual self-interest, as opposed to the dependent 
social capital associated with rent-driven urbanization. Consequently, low-rent countries 
accelerate both the emergence of an integrated settlement hierarchy (of villages nesting 
in the hinterlands of towns, which in turn nest in those of cities) that promotes 
competitive markets and the formation of a resilient linking social capital.  
 
At high-income levels, however, the rate of social capital formation may decelerate or 
even regress because institutions and pressure groups become so specialized and 
powerful as to raise transaction costs (Killick 1995) by pursuing single-issue interests at 
the expense of the broader social interest, which is more diffuse and less vigorously 
defended. These ‘Olson effects’ are particularly associated with countries that enjoy 
prolonged periods of stability like the USSR prior to the late 1980s (Olson 2000b 119-
37) and the legacy can persist (Jones Luong 2002). 
 
Finally, formal legal institutions increase in importance as economic development 
proceeds, relative to social capital because; ‘large anonymous markets are more 
effective than [informal] networks because the “best” buyer or seller may not be part of 
the network’ (Serageldin and Grooteart 2000: 213). Such markets require the creation of 
effective institutions, notably a legal system and property rights. Clague et al. (1997: 67-
90) concur, and argue that: ‘societal differences in property rights and contract 
enforcement mechanisms are an important part of the explanation of why some 
countries prosper while others do not.’ 
 
There is evidence that increasing competition (and decreasing rent dependence) with 
rising PCGDP along the CIM trajectory strengthens demands from businesses to 
improve property rights and the rule of law. For example, SOE managers in China 
demanded strengthened legal guarantees for transactions and property rights as they 
assumed more responsibility for becoming self-funding (Li et al. 2000). The process 
acquired a self-sustaining momentum as competitive markets proliferated. 
4  The exogenous democratization model 
We now examine the link between the STM development trajectory and sanctions 
against anti-social governance, but first we summarise the main features of the STM. 
4.1  High-rent growth: the staple trap model 
In the resource-rich developing countries, the presence of resource rents, which 
typically ranged between 13-21 per cent of GDP in the mid 1990s (Table 3), increases   12
the attraction for governments of capturing and distributing the rents and thereby diverts 
effort away from promoting wealth creation. It also extends the period of reliance on 
primary product exports, which delays competitive industrialization (Lal and Myint 
1998). Under a non-developmental political state the virtuous economic and social 
circles of early labour-intensive industrialization are omitted so that competitive 
diversification of the economy is aborted and incomes polarise. The resulting staple trap 
development trajectory accumulates human capital and social capital more slowly and 
erratically than the competitive industrialization trajectory. A caveat is in order, 
however, where governments of resource-rich countries are motivated to generate 
wealth in order to placate a large low-income rural constituency, as for example in 
Malaysia and Indonesia. In such circumstances, the political state may remain 
developmental so that competitive industrialization is merely retarded, rather than 
aborted (Auty and Gelb 2001). 
 
More usually, however, the incentive to boost rural welfare has been rare in resource-
abundant countries in recent decades, so that the capture of natural resource rents has 
more typically deflected the political state from nurturing wealth creation and into 
predation. Moreover, the longer reliance on primary product exports under a predatory 
political state does not merely retard competitive industrialization, but instead postpones 
it indefinitely. This is because in the absence of rapid labour-intensive industrialization, 
surplus rural labour persists and prompts the government to use the rents to create 
employment directly and inefficiently instead of indirectly by nurturing efficient wealth 
creation. Consequently, diversification occurs into an over-expanded government 
bureaucracy and protected industry, which is not only inefficient but also, ironically, 
capital-intensive (Ibid). 
 
Far from achieving competitive diversification, the staple trap trajectory renders an 
increasingly large sector of the economy dependent on subsidies from the rent. This 
expanding parasitic sector absorbs a greater share of resources so that the economy-
wide efficiency of investment is depressed and GDP growth slows. Yet the rent 
recipients form a powerful vested interest and block economic reform. Therefore, as the 
rents shrink relative to GDP, either because of ongoing structural change or falling 
prices for the leading commodity, a non-developmental government finds it politically 
attractive to sustain transfers to the parasitic sector by extracting the returns to capital as 
well as the rent from the commodity sector. But this depresses incentives in the primary 
sector and erodes its competitiveness. This is the essence of the staple trap model: a 
predatory political state uses rent to subsidise employment and thereby aborts 
competitive diversification so the economy is increasingly vulnerable to shocks and a 
growth collapse (Annexe Figure 2).   13


















1,2      
  Large  4.7  10.56  7.34  3.22 
  Small  2.4  9.86  5.41  4.45 
Resource  rich      
  Large  1.9  12.65  5.83  6.86 
  Small, non-mineral  0.9  15.42  12.89  2.53 
  Small, hard mineral  -0.4  17.51  9.62  7.89 
  Small, oil exporter  -0.7  21.22  2.18  19.04 
All countries   15.03  8.78  6.25 
1Resource-poor = 1970 cropland/head  < 0.3 hectares, mineral economies draw > 40% of exports from 
mining. 
2Large = 1970 GDP > US$billion. 
Source: Auty and Gelb (2001: 131). 
 
4.2  STM and sanctions against anti-social governance 
Ross (2001) notes that oil-rich governments have the highest rents among the developing 
countries, which they have used to reduce taxation, which in turn weakens demands for 
representation and democratic accountability. As the GDP growth rate decelerates along 
the staple trap trajectory, competition for the rent stream intensifies so that, far from 
depoliticizing the economy, the staple trap trajectory increases government intervention. 
Krueger (1993: 61-73) attests that the resulting system of overt and covert levies and 
subsidies becomes too complex for either policy-makers or economic agents to 
understand the cause and effect relationship. In addition, the diversification of public 
finances stalls and ‘taxation’ may extract a sizeable fraction of the return to capital and 
labour in the primary sector to meet the demands of the parasitic sector when these 
demands outstrip the rent-generating capacity of the primary sector. This is especially 
likely in the presence of natural resource extraction that is characterised by high sunk 
costs (Mcmillan 1997). Far from strengthening, therefore, political accountability 
regresses as the collision between the expanding patronage system that hitherto 
sustained the authority of the government and shrinking rents renders the political state 
brittle so that it concentrates rent on key supporters and resorts to repression to maintain 
its control.  
 
Social capital formed under rent dependence, as with the parasitic urban sector that is 
characteristic of most rent-rich countries (Gelb et al. 1991), is likely to prove distinctly 
less effective as a sanction against anti-social governance compared with the more 
autonomous civic associations produced by competitive urbanization. A second cause of 
atrophying social capital under dependent urbanization is the fact that a growth collapse   14
reduces per capita income and thereby increases corruption and rent seeking (Treisman 
(2002). The fact that most developing countries are rent-rich may explain why Barro 
(1999) finds little evidence that (dependent) urbanization is more strongly associated 
with voice and political accountability than rusticity. 
 
Corruption also weakens institutions like the rule of law. This is partly because a growth 
collapse depresses public sector revenues and is associated with declining real wages in 
the public sector. The resulting under-remuneration provides an incentive for public 
officials at all levels of government to augment their incomes by abusing the 
government monopoly of public service provision. Atomised corruption therefore 
undermines the integrity of the legal system and sharply raises transaction costs (Mauro 
1995). In the absence of effective formal institutions, able people may find rent-seeking 
much more lucrative than work in legitimate channels. Social sanctions such as shaming 
also appear to be ineffective in such circumstances so corruption plays a central role in 
corroding social capital.  
 
It therefore seems plausible that all three sanctions against anti-social governance will 
stagnate or regress along the STM trajectory as PCGDP growth decelerates and 
governments dependent on dispensing rent to maintain their authority resort to 
repression. However, a growth collapse may abruptly trigger democracy, if exogenous 
factors are conducive. One such favourable external factor is the conditional provision 
of geopolitical rent by high-income democracies, which is most likely to occur after a 
growth collapse and this is also when it is at its most effective (Mayer and Mourmourus 
2002). Relative location, in the form of a regional neighbourhood effect, is a second 
exogenous determinant of political evolution according to the political science 
literature. For instance, O’Loughlin et al. (1998) document global regional fluxes 
between democratic and autocratic regimes since 1946, which point to a strong regional 
demonstration effect. They link this to shared contextual constraints: ‘At the meso-level 
[global regional level], certain types of regionally clustered states are more susceptible 
to democratization than other regions due to “snowballing” or contagion effects from 
neighbours. The internal conditions in neighbouring states are typically similar and they 
provide similar impetus toward regime transition ...’ (O’Loughlin et al. 1998: 549). 
 
De Soysa (2003) finds further evidence to support the spatial diffusion of democracy, 
based on the regression of institutional, economic and social factors on the Polity III 
index of democracy. He shows that levels of PCGDP and urbanization are positively 
associated with democracy, whereas negative associations arise for growth collapses, oil 
dependence and Muslim religion. The addition of regional dummies deflates the 
importance of PCGDP as a determinant of democracy, however, and strengthens 
regional conformity. It therefore seems likely that democracy diffuses geographically 
and survives where neighbours are not hostile to it. The exogenous democratization path 
may therefore explain the fact that the shift towards democracy has historically often 
required external pressure to come to fruition (Ibid.: 552). For example, Whitehead   15
(1986) finds very few instances of democratization that can be attributed to purely 
endogenous factors. He concludes that outsiders have heavily influenced the vast 
majority of democratization episodes, but he makes no attempt to qualify the 
generalization according to growth experience or resource endowment.  
 
In summary, the link between exogenous democratization and growth collapses in rent-
rich countries, which can occur at almost any income level, yields a less predictable and 
more erratic pattern of political evolution for high-rent countries compared with low-
rent countries. It also suggests that there is more likelihood that high-rent countries may 
regress or that, at least, a prolonged period of consolidation of democracy may 
characterise such rent countries, especially at lower income levels. Such an outcome is 
consistent with the recent finding of Epstein et al. (2004) who usefully identify a 
category of ‘consolidating democracies’ as a neglected sub-group of political state 
among developing countries.  
5  Simple tests of the model predictions 
This section reports some very preliminary tests of the political economy models. 
Table 4, drawn from a paper by Woolcock et al. (2001), provides a rough and ready test 
of the evolution of political accountability. It uses a country’s export dependence as a 
proxy for its natural resource endowment, so that low-rent developing countries are 
identified as exporters of manufactured goods. Table 4 (main column 1) confirms that 
political liberty is significantly higher among manufacturing exporting (low-rent) 
countries. The differences are not large, however, given the full range of that particular 
scale and the fact that, as a group, the low-rent countries have a higher PCGDP than the 
high-rent countries. These doubts about the endogenous democratization model’s 
predicted strengthening of political accountability with increasing PCGDP are 
reinforced by a second test, based on the World Bank (2002) perceptions index of voice 
and accountability (Table 5). Moreover, the correlation coefficient for PCGDP and 
voice and accountability is not significant for the resource-poor countries (Table 6). It is 
also relatively weak for the resource-rich countries, but this is not inconsistent with the 
exogenous growth model. 
 
Column 3 in Table 4 tests the social capital thesis using a social development indicator, 
which is based on a factor analysis of a range of variables determined by Adelman and 
Morris (1967). The index suggests that social capital does accumulate faster in those 
developing countries that export manufactured goods (i.e. low-rent countries) than in 
rent-rich countries, in line with the competitive industrialization model. The social 
development index is by far and away highest for the low-rent countries.  
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All  countries  90  3.06 88 3.19 88 -0.07  62 2.26  80 2.19 80
  (minimum, maximum)    (1, 7)    (1, 7)    (-1.86, 1.59)   (0, 6)    (0, 6)   
Manufactured goods  9  3.63  8  3.19 8  0.23  5  3.75  8 3.88 8 
Resource: diffuse  18  2.94  18  3.31 18 0.17  12 2.06  17 1.94 17
Resource: point source  45  3.09  44 3.17 44 -0.14  31 2.24  40 2.08 40
Resource: mixed 
(coffee and cocoa) 
18  2.83 18 3.14 18 -0.25 14 1.73 15  1.87  15
Notes: The first row lists the means of five indicators of social and political institutions and their available 
sub-sample sizes (among the larger sample of 90 countries); the second row lists the minima and maxima 
or the indicators. The other rows are the means and sub-sample sizes of the indicators among four 
classifications of socioeconomic linkages. In all cases, higher values indicate a more desirable social or 
political outcome. 
Source: After Woolcock et al. (2001: 86). 
 



















All countries  4740  -0.24  -0.33  -0.32  -0.30 
Resource poor  7060  -0.13  -0.16  -0.21  -0.17 
Resource rich  3970  -0.28  -0.40  -0.38  -0.35 
Note: institutional quality ranges from 2.5 high to -2.5 low. 
Source: Auty and Gelb (2001: 131) and World Bank (2002). 
 
Regression analysis for PCGDP and voice confirms the absence of the predicted 
significant relationship among the resource-poor countries (Table 7), but the scatter plot 
helps show why (Annexe Figure 3). The voice indices of all three Chinese territories are 
significantly below the expected levels, given their PCGDP and if they are excluded 
from the regression, the R
2 quadruples to 0.59 and becomes significant. The fact that 
South Korea, as well as Hong Kong and Singapore, among the higher income resource-
poor countries also has a lower voice index than is predicted by the adjusted trend line 
suggests that political accountability may lag in high-growth low-rent countries, even 
when they espouse democracy. One possible reason for this is that historically justified 
expectations of continued sustained rises in welfare ease pressure for more political 
accountability. Finally, among the resource-rich countries, the R
2 for voice and PCGDP 
is significant but only 0.22 (Table 7), indicating that as expected with exogenous 
democratization, voice has little connection to PCGDP. However, the scatter about the 
trend line narrows at higher income levels for these countries.    17
Table 6: Correlations, PCI (PPPUS$) and voice, graft and law, 
by natural resource endowment  
 
Resource endowment 
Voice Graft Rule of law  PCGDP 2000 
(US$ PPP)
Resource poor         
  PPP$ Pearson correlation  0.385  0.912**  0.897**  1 
    Significance (2 tailed)  0.141  0.000  0.000  – 
    N  16  16  16  16 
  Voice Pearson correlation 1  0.417  0.451  0.385 
    Significance (2 tailed)  –  0.108  0.079  0.141 
    N  16  16  18  16 
  Graft Pearson correlation  0.417  1  0.936**  0.912** 
    Significance (2 tailed)  0.108  –  0.000  0.000 
    N  16  16  16  16 
  Law Pearson correlation  0.451  0.936**  1  0.897** 
    Significance (2 tailed)  0.079  0.000  –  0.000 
    N  48  16  16  16 
Resource Rich         
  PPP$ Pearson correlation  0.469**  0.607**  0.683**  1 
    Significance (2 tailed)  0.001  0.000  0.000  – 
    N  46  46  48  48 
  Voice Pearson correlation 1  0.612**  0.577**  0.469** 
    Significance (2 tailed)  –  0.000  0.000  0.001 
    N  49  47  49  46 
  Graft Pearson correlation  0.612**  1  0.742**  0.607** 
    Significance (2 tailed)  0.000  –  0.000  0.000 
    N  47  47  47  46 
  Law Pearson correlation  0.577**  0.742**  1  0.683** 
    Significance (2 tailed)  0.00  0.000  –  0.000 
    N  49  47  49  48 
Note: institutional quality ranges from 2.5 high to –2.5 low. **significant with a two-tail test.  
Source: World Bank (2002). 
 
Corruption affords a second (proxy) index of the social capital endowment, being higher 
where social capital is weaker (Treisman 2002). Table 5 shows that the resource-poor 
countries have less corruption, measured by the World Bank (2002) index of graft than 
the resource-rich countries. The correlation coefficient for graft and PCI in Table 6 
confirms a significantly stronger inverse relationship between per capita GDP and 
corruption for the low-rent countries compared with high-rent countries. Finally, 
consistent with the endogenous democratization model, regressing graft upon PCGDP 
provides a strongly significant and high R
2 of 0.831 for the low-rent countries compared 
with 0.368 for the high-rent countries, which as expected exhibit much more variation 
around the trend line (Annexe Figure 4).   18
Table 7: Regression of voice, graft and law on PCGDP (US$ PPP) 
Dependent variable  R
2 Significance 
Low rent   
  Voice  0.148 0.141 
  Graft  0.831 0.000 
  Law  0.804 0.000 
High rent    
  Voice  0.220 0.001 
  Graft  0.368 0.000 
  Law  0.467 0.000 
Source: World Bank (2002). 
 
Finally the index for rule of law in Table 4 (column 5) suggests that exporters of 
manufactured goods (low-rent countries) enjoy markedly stronger rule of law than the 
three resource-rich groups. In addition, Table 5 shows that low-rent countries have 
stronger legal institutions than low-rent countries. The correlation coefficients in 
Table 6 for this same relationship reinforce this pattern: the correlation coefficient for 
low-rent countries is strongly significant (p = 0.000) and 0.897 compared with 0.683 for 
the high-rent countries. Finally, the R
2 for the regression of law on PCI is strongly 
significant in each category of rent endowment and a very high 0.804 for the low-rent 
countries compared with only 0.467 for the high-rent group (Table 7 and Annexe 
Figure 5).  
 
Summarising, in the cases of social capital and law, but not political accountability, the 
data support the prediction of the endogenous democratization model that sanctions 
against anti-social governance strengthen with rising PCGDP for low-rent countries. 
The low reading for political accountability is strongly affected by limited freedom in 
all three Chinese-speaking low-rent territories, but even when these territories are 
removed it remains significantly weaker than the other two sanctions. This lag may 
reflect the readiness of citizens in developmental states to trade-off political freedom for 
sustained growth in PCGDP.  
6  Some policy implications 
The development of a strategy for reforming the political economy of collapsed high-
rent countries will provide an example of the policy implications of the models 
developed here. Although successful economic reform can reinforce democratic 
consolidation by triggering rapid GDP growth, the reform of collapsed high-rent 
economies over the past two decades has proved disappointing, with growth often two-
thirds or half the targeted rate, so that PCGDP growth rates were often negative 
(Table  3). Within the reform packages, programmes for economic stabilization have 
been more successful than those for economic restructuring. However, slow or negative 
PCGDP growth undermines stabilization efforts, trapping economies in a slow-growth   19
trajectory that also undermines the political consolidation of reforming regimes. A 
principal cause of failed restructuring is opposition from vested (rent-capturing) 
interests that stand to lose from reform, which either block reform or capture the policy 
and bend it to their advantage (Auty 2002). 
 
In the face of blocked reform, geopolitical and/or natural resource rents might be 
directed towards supporting a dual track reform programme. The essence of the dual 
track reform strategy is to grow a dynamic market sector in early reform zones (ERZs) 
equipped from the very outset with post-reform (world class) infrastructure, economic 
incentives and institutions. The dynamic market sector not only creates conditions 
conducive to rapid GDP growth, but just as importantly it also builds a pro-reform 
political constituency while initially leaving the rest of the economy (termed the 
‘lagging sector’) and its anti-reform political interest groups, to be reformed gradually. 
This dual track reform strategy has been systematically applied by China since the 
1980s. But other successful structural reformers have stumbled upon a variant of the 
strategy by encouraging competitive export zones, like Malaysia and Mauritius in 
the 1970s, or by permitting highly efficient domestic enterprises to capture the bulk of 
the rents provided by ‘infant’ industry policies, as in Indonesia (Flatters and Jenkins 
1986). Ireland also pursued a variant of this policy when it nurtured a dynamic market 
sector from the late 1980s, which saw FDI quadruple (to 2.8 per cent of GDP annually) 
and grew to produce half the country’s manufactured exports within a decade (Gorg and 
Ruane 2000). As it emerges from incubation the dynamic market sector strengthens in 
terms of its capacity to absorb under-employed workers from the lagging sector and 
generate foreign exchange and tax revenues. 
 
The Irish economy was similar in size to that of Algeria in the late 1980s (Auty 2002), 
implying that a dynamic market sector may take a decade to reach a scale sufficient to 
favourably impact the lagging sector of a middle-sized developing country. Such a time 
period is not dissimilar from the period during which competitive manufacturing sectors 
in Malaysia and Indonesia grew before being required to assume the role of growth 
locomotive when oil prices collapsed in 1985. This suggests that a highly rent-rich 
country like Algeria might use a fraction of its rents to support this incubation period 
not by subsidies but by correcting market failure though the provision of modern 
infrastructure and maintenance of an enabling macro-economic environment. In other 
countries, geopolitical rent might be targeted to similar effect.  
 
Meanwhile, reform of the lagging sector can proceed more cautiously until the dynamic 
sector’s economic and political impacts render its acceleration feasible. The long-term 
objective of reform of the lagging sector is to align it with conditions in the ERZs in 
terms of infrastructure, incentives and institutional quality. More immediately some 
modest restructuring can be achieved by encouraging private construction firms within 
the lagging sector to substitute employment for that erstwhile provided by the state-  20
backed parasitic subsector so that the government can focus its social expenditure on 
those least able to fend for themselves (Auty 2002). 
 
Bolder policy initiatives might be feasible in the wake of a growth collapse, using 
geopolitical rent to strengthen government incentives to support pro-poor policies. For 
example, geopolitical rent might be provided on condition that commodity rent is 
distributed equitably among the population in the form of an annual dividend, as 
currently carried out in Alaska, and recently proposed for Iran (World Bank 2001). This 
diffuse deployment of the rent should both improve economic efficiency16 and help 
consolidate a developmental political state. 
7  Conclusions and some policy implications 
In connection with the initial stages of designing a research programme, this paper has 
presented some initial speculations regarding the manner in which economic rent affects 
the evolution of the political state in developing countries. The political economy 
models described here imply that low-rent countries have superior prospects for 
democratization as well as for economic growth compared to high-rent countries. The 
models are motivated by the insight that the lower and more diffuse the rents the greater 
the likelihood that the political state will be developmental and sustain rapid PCGDP 
growth that strengthens sanctions against anti-social governance.  
 
The paper identifies two basic routes to democracy. The first route, endogenous 
democratization, is associated with high-growth, low-rent countries and tends to be 
incremental and stable. Simple tests suggest that two of the three basic sanctions against 
anti-social governance (social capital and rule of law) do strengthen with rapidly rising 
PCGDP in low-rent countries. Political accountability lags the model predictions, 
however, and this may reflect the trade-off by citizens of sustained rising welfare for 
less political freedom.  
 
High-rent countries are more likely to experience exogenous democratization. The 
exogenous factors can be systematic (like geopolitical rent and relative location) or 
idiosyncratic (like leadership change). High-rent countries are likely to trace the staple 
trap development trajectory, which corrodes all sanctions against anti-social 
governance, and the more so the higher and more concentrated the rents. Consequently, 
countries with rents that are unusually high relative to GDP and concentrated like the 
oil-exporting countries are especially vulnerable. However, a growth collapse creates 
scope for democratization, which can occur at almost any level of PCGDP and may 
regress and/or require a prolonged period of consolidation. Moreover, the significance 
attached to exogenous factors in the process of recovery from a growth collapse (which 
is in any case likely to be protracted and take more than a generation, given the 
                                                 
16 Baldwin (1956); Bevan et al. (1987).   21
deterioration of all forms of capital ahead of such a collapse) suggests that geopolitical 
rent is as an important instrument for consolidating shifts towards developmental 
regimes and for discouraging regression.  
 
These speculations motivate a proposed research programme that is planned to proceed 
in three stages. The first stage will involve in-depth country case studies designed to 
tighten and refine the evolutionary typology of political states by, for example, adding 
more detail regarding political relations within each category. Stage two will test the 
capacity of the typology to explain current measures of the quality of governance in 
developing countries, providing further scope to hone up the basic typology and fine-
tune the rent-based models that drive it. Finally, the dynamic component of the models 
will be strengthened with time series data, using early sociopolitical datasets, such as 
that of Adelman and Morris (1967) for the early 1960s to construct the required indices 
of the initial political economy conditions. 
References 
Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson (2005). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, MIT Press: Cambridge MA. 
Adelman, I., and C.T. Morris (1967). Society, Politics and Economic Development, 
Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.  
Aslund, A. (2000). ‘Why Has Russia’s Economic Transformation Been So Arduous?’, 
in B. Pleskovic and J.E. Stiglitz (eds) Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics 1999, World Bank: Washington DC. 
Auty, R.M. (2001). Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford 
University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford.  
Auty, R.M. (2002). ‘Integrating Industrialising Oil-Exporting Countries into the Global 
Economy: Egypt and Algeria’, mimeo, MNSIF, MENA, World Bank: Washington 
DC.  
Auty, R.M., and A.H. Gelb (2001). ‘Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States’, 
in R.M. Auty (ed.) Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford 
University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Auty, R.M., and S. Kiiski (2001). Natural Resources, Capital Accumulation and 
Welfare, in R.M. Auty (ed.) Resource Abundance and Economic Development, 
Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Baldwin, R.E. (1956). ‘Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions’, Manchester 
School of Social and Economic Studies 24: 161-79.  
Barro, R. (1996). ‘Democracy and Growth’, Journal of Economic Growth 1: 1-27.   22
Barro, R. (1999). ‘Determinants of Democracy’, Journal of Political Economy 107(6): 
158-83. 
Bevan, D.I., P. Collier, and J.W. Gunning (1987). ‘Consequences of a Commodity 
Boom in a Controlled Economy: Accumulation and Redistribution in Kenya’, World 
Bank Economic Review 1: 489-513. 
Birdsall, N., T. Pinckney, and R. Sabot (2001). Natural Resources, Human Capital and 
Growth, in R.M. Auty (ed.) Resource Abundance and Economic Development, 
Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Boix, C., and S.C. Stokes (2003). Endogenous Democratization, World Politics 55(3): 
517-45. 
Burkhart, R.E., and M.S. Lewis-Beck (1994). ‘Comparative Democracy: The Economic 
Development Thesis’, American Political Science Review 88: 903-10. 
Clague, C., P. Keefer, K. Knack, and M. Olson (1997). ‘Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement, in C. Clague (ed.) Institutions 
and Economic Development, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.  
De Soysa, I. (2003). ‘Why George W. Bush May Become Champion of Democracy’, 
mimeo, ZEF: Bonn. 
Djankov, S., E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2003). ‘The 
New Comparative Economics’, Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 595-619. 
Eifert, B., A.H. Gelb, and N.B. Tallroth (2003). ‘The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy 
and Economic Management in Oil-Exporting Countries’, in J.M. Davis, 
R. Ossowski, and A. Fedelino (eds) Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation 
in Oil-Producing Countries, International Monetary Fund: Washington DC.  
Epstein, D.L., R. Bates, J. Goldstone, I. Kristensen, and S. O’Halloran (2004). 
‘Democratic Transitions’, CID Working Paper 101, Centre for International 
Development: Cambridge MA. 
Feng, Y., and P.J. Zak (1999). ‘Determinants of Demographic Transitions’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 43: 162-77. 
Findlay, R., and S. Wellisz (1993). The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: 
Five Small Open Economies, Oxford University Press: New York. 
Flatters, F., and G. Jenkins (1986). ‘Trade Policy in Indonesia’, mimeo, Harvard Institute 
for International Development: Cambridge MA. 
Gelb, A.H., J. Knight, and R. Sabot (1991), ‘Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking 
and Economic Growth’, The Economic Journal 101: 1186-99. 
Gorg, H., and F. Ruane (2000). European Integration and Periphery: Lessons From Irish 
Experience, The World Economy 23(3): 405-21.   23
Haggard, S. (1990). Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries, Cornell University Press: Ithaca NY. 
Hamilton, K. (2001). ‘The Sustainability of Extractive Industries’, in R.M. Auty (ed.) 
Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford University Press for 
UNU-WIDER: Oxford.  
Jackman, R.W. (1973). ‘On the Relationship of Economic Development to Political 
Performance’, American Journal of Political Science 17: 611-21. 
Johnson, E.A.J. (1970). The Organization and Use of Space in the Developing 
Countries, Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA. 
Jones Luong, P. (2002). Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet 
Central Asia: Power, Perceptions and Pacts, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Kaufmann, D., and A. Kraay (2002). ‘Growth Without Governance’, World Bank 
Working Paper 2928, World Bank: Washington DC. 
Khan, M.H., and K.S. Jomo (eds) (2000). Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic 
Development, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Killick, T. (1995). The Flexible Economy, Routledge: London. 
Krueger, A.O. (1993). The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy: A 
Synthesis of the Political Economy in Developing Countries, Johns Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore. 
Lal, D. (1995). ‘Why Growth Rates Differ: The Political Economy of Social Capability 
in 21 Developing Countries’, in B.H. Koo and D.H. Perkins (eds) Social Capability 
and Long-run Economic Growth, Macmillan: Basingstoke.  
Lal, D., and H. Myint (1999). The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: A 
Comparative Study, Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Li, S., S. Li, and W. Zhang (2000). ‘The Road to Capitalism: Competition and 
Institutional Change in China’, Journal of Comparative Economics 28: 269-92. 
Lipset, S.M. (1959). ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53: 69-105. 
Lizzeri, A., and N. Persico (2004). ‘Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? 
Democracy and the Scope of Government With Application to Britain’s Age of 
Reform’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 707-65. 
Mauro, P. (1995). ‘Corruption and Growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 
681-712.   24
Mayer, W., and A. Mourmourus (2002). ‘Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI 
Conditionality’,  IMF Working Papers 02/73, International Monetary Fund: 
Washington DC. 
Mcmillan, M. (1997). ‘A Dynamic Theory of Primary Export Taxation: Evidence from 
sub-Saharan Africa’, mimeo, Columbia University: New York. 
O’Loughlin, J., M.D. Ward, C.L. Lofdahl, J.S. Cohen, D.S. Brown, D. Reilly, K.S. 
Gleditsch, and M. Shin (1998). ‘The diffusion of Democracy 1946-94’, Annals 
Association of American Geographers 88(4): 545-74. 
Olson, M. (2000a). Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist 
Dictatorships, Basic Books: New York. 
Olson, M. (2000b). ‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’, in M. Olson and 
S. Kahkonen  (eds)  A Not-so-Dismal Science: A Broader View of Economies and 
Societies, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Owen, W. (1967). Distance and Development, Brookings Institution: Washington DC. 
Przeworski, A., M.E. Alvarez, J.A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi (2000). Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Ranis, G. and S. Mahmood (1992). The Political Economy of Development Policy 
Change, Blackwell: Oxford. 
Ross, M. (2001). ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, World Politics 53(3): 325-61. 
Serageldin, I., and C. Grootaert (2000). ‘Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View’, 
in R. Picciotto and E. Wiesner (eds) Evaluation and Development: The Institutional 
Dimension, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick.  
Stiglitz, J.E. (1995). ‘Social Absorption Capability And Innovation’, in B.H. Koo and D.H. 
Perkins (eds) Social Capability and Long-Term Economic Growth, Macmillan: 
Basingstoke. 
Syrquin, M. (1986). Productivity Growth and Factor Reallocation, in H. Chenery, 
S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin (eds) Industrialization and Growth: A Comparative 
Study, Oxford University Press: New York.  
Treisman, D. (2002). ‘Post-Communist Corruption’, mimeo, Department of Political 
Science, UCLA: Los Angeles. 
Whitehead, L. (1986). International Aspects of Democratization’, in G. O’Donnell, 
P.C.  Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds) Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 
Woolcock, M., and D. Narayan (2000). ‘Social Capital: Implications for Development 
Theory, Research and Policy’, World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 225-49.    25
Woolcock, M., L. Pritchett, and J. Isham (2001). ‘The Social Foundations of Poor 
Economic Growth in Resource-Rich Countries’, in R.M. Auty (ed.) Resource 
Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: 
Oxford. 
World Bank (1997). ‘Expanding The Measure of Wealth’, Environmentally Sustainable 
Development Studies and Monograph Series 17, World Bank: Washington DC. 
World Bank (2002). Estimates of Governance Quality, World Bank: Washington DC. 
Zak, P.J., and Y. Feng (2003). ‘A Dynamic Theory of the Transition to Democracy’, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52: 1-25. 
 
 Annexe 















low resource rent 
endogenous 
consensual democracy 









Produced Capital  Natural Capital  Human Capital  Social Capital 













































surplus labour +  
slow skill accumulation 
primary 
















Figure 3: Relationship between PCGDP (PPP $US 2000) and voice 


















































































































































graft = -0.87 + 0.00 * ppp
R-Square = 0.37



















































































law = -0.87 + 0.00 * ppp
R-Square = 0.47



















law = -0.91 + 0.00 * ppp
R-Square = 0.80
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